The bomber generals who had ruled the USAF since World War II gave way to the fighter generals, who were much more interested in the tactical aspects of warfighting.Ĭonsequently, the Air Force was more than willing to play a strong supporting role in both Active Defense and AirLand Battle. The Vietnam War had scorched both services, but it had also accompanied a generational shift in the Air Force. AirLand Battle grappled with the insights that made Active Defense possible, and turned those insights in an offensive direction.ĪirLand Battle was Army doctrine, not joint doctrine, but it arrived at a nearly unique moment in the history of Air Force-Army relations. Both represented an effort to come to grip with changes in military technology, and both adopted many of the same tactical fixes to those problems (including the increased use of PGMs, better infantry-armor cooperation, improved surveillance, and well-developed command and control arrangements). These attacks, using precision-guided munitions at stand-off ranges, would disrupt the guts of the Soviet offensive.Īnd indeed, AirLand Battle and Active Defense were not as far apart as is commonly believed. As NATO forces were carrying out counter-offensive operations, AirLand Battle envisioned waves of attacks deep behind Warsaw Pact lines, targeting logistical and communications hubs. While much of AirLand Battle hearkened back to the classic traditions of mobile armored warfare, it also included elements that looked forward to the next Military-Technical Revolution, or Revolution in Military Affairs. AirLand Battle expected to take advantage of NATO’s decentralized control structure and flexible command-and-control arrangements by giving local commanders a great deal of latitude what mattered was disrupting the Soviet offensive, rather than a larger operational goal associated with some territorial target. The counter-attacks would throw the Soviets off-balance, and limit the extent to which they could penetrate into the vitals of NATO defenses. These attacks would disrupt the opponent, allowing the successful exploitation of a breakthrough.ĪirLand Battle expected NATO forces to counter-attack Soviet armored spearheads almost immediately as they achieved initial breakthrough. Deep Battle envisioned a simultaneous set of attacks deep inside an enemy position, using long-range artillery, airstrikes, and paratroopers. Recommended: What Will the Sixth-Generation Jet Fighter Look Like?įirst published in 1982, and further developed in 1986, AirLand Battle hearkened back to the “deep battle” concepts developed in cooperation between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Recommended: Why No Commander Wants to Take On a Spike Missile Recommended: Forget the F-35: The Tempest Could Be the Future The next iteration of Army doctrine, AirLand Battle, sought to restore maneuver to the battlefield. It promised to take advantage of the latest in military technology, but left the initiative wholly in the hands of the Soviets. However, many in the Army hated the perceived passivity of Active Defense. It’s not entirely fair to characterize Active Defense as an attrition strategy, because it certainly included elements of maneuver (aspects of it recalled the development of elastic defenses on the Western Front in 19). Army heavily revised its doctrine into what became known as “Active Defense.” Active Defense envisioned funneling Soviet armored spearheads into semi-stationary blocking positions, where increasingly lethal precision-guided munitions would tear them to pieces. Although the Israelis eventually encircled the Egyptians, the conflict seemed to demonstrate that the balance of military technology had shifted to favor the tactical defense.
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